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1 Introduction 
The safe use of chemicals, other than for chem-
icals used for medicines or pesticides and biocides,
is normally ensured by other means than a formal
and necessarily quite bureaucratic authorisation.
Hence, the authorisation procedure under REACH
– the EU chemicals regulation (Regulation (EC) No
1907/2006) – is intended for substances of very
high concern (SVHC). Only these substances with
specific intrinsic properties which are particularly
hazardous to human health or the environment
may be subject to authorisation under REACH.
Examples for SVHCs are metals such as lead or cad-
mium being used in batteries, plastic softeners like
DEHP e.g. used in consumer products and medical
devices, chromium trioxide used for surface treat-
ment (chrome plating) or certain solvents such as
DMAC used in the production of textiles and dial-
ysis membranes.
Substances identified as fulfilling the SVHC cri-
teria are included in the so called “candidate list”.
Identified SVHCs represent the candidates which
may be listed on Annex XIV – the “authorisation
list”. Including substances into the candidate list,
inter alia, leads to further obligations of commu-
nicating risks within the supply chain and is there-
by contributing to safe use. Producers, importers
and distributors of articles have to communicate
information about SVHCs contained in articles and
necessary risk management measures to the recip-
ients of the articles and to provide this informa-
tion to consumers on request. 
Inclusion in the candidate list can put pressure
on suppliers to substitute SVHCs with lower risk
alternatives but some SVHCs may be required to
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achieve certain qualities of a product and it may
not always be easy to replace them with alterna-
tives. As oftentimes cited by industry representa-
tives, the process of publicly identifying a substance
as an SVHC via its inclusion in the candidate list
may threaten or even damage a company’s repu-
tation (cf. Grunwald and Hennig, 2012). This poten-
tial impact has been termed the “announcement
effect” of the candidate list (cf. Heitmann and
Reihlen, 2007). Here, the term reputation is broad-
ly defined as a market-average expectation of stake-
holders towards a supplier’s product quality and
production related conduct including product per-
formance, consumer and environmental safety
issues. Thus, a certain level of positive vs. negative
reputation reflects stakeholders’ (e.g. consumers’)
high vs. low confidence or trust into the supplier’s
quality and conduct (cf. Schwalbach, 2000;
Büschken, 1999 and 2000; Dean, 2004; Standop,
2006). 
The announcement effect could hold because
sensitized (private or organizational) buyers may
react negatively by attributing blame on suppliers
who knowingly sold products containing SVHCs.
Consequently, they form negative attitudes towards
suppliers and finally may terminate business rela-
tions. As organizational customers, they may even
find themselves confronted with risking their own
reputation and business. In a number of cases, retail-
ers already reacted by proactively blacklisting or
banning SVHC-related products. Tchibo, one of Ger-
many’s biggest multichannel-retailers, provides a
practical example for this (cf. Tchibo, 2011). 
Especially for small and medium-sized compa-
nies such as formulators that rely on being able to
use a specific substance, negative publicity induced
by the candidate list can pose a critical threat. It
should be noted that these potential negative
impacts need to be viewed in the context of the
benefits REACH provides (cf. European Commis-
sion, 2003; Getzner, 2013). It should also be consid-
ered that there are other REACH related costs to
industry such as the cost of testing chemicals. Com-
pared with the direct costs of complying with
REACH, indirect costs such as the blacklist effect
are generally more difficult to estimate and less
well known.
As research on reputational effects of the can-
didate list is scarce or limited to anecdotal descrip-
tions, the primary research goal of this paper is to
develop a comprehensive behavioral psychologi-
cal model consisting of research hypotheses capa-
ble of explaining the various reputational effects
of the candidate list, thereby enabling an assess-
ment of the potential loss of reputation and a bet-
ter understanding of the blacklist effect. This
includes uncovering determinants to influence any
potential reputational loss, like e.g. availability of
substance alternatives. Due to varying roles and
dependencies of actors in affected supply chains,
reputational effects may vary considerably between
these actors. Therefore, an actor-specific analysis
of reputation is conducted considering reputation-
al impacts of the candidate list on manufacturers,
downstream users and distributors. These hypothe-
ses are then discussed based on current empirical
data surveyed by the European Commission on
behavioral adaptations within REACH supply chains.
Since REACH is still relatively new and its provisions
are only starting to show effects, these data reflect
preliminary experience of companies with the
REACH provisions. 
2 REACH and the candidate list of sub-
stances subject to authorisation 
The REACH Regulation first entered into force
in 2007 and is built on four pillars: the Registration,
Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of CHem-
ical substances. Authorisation is a risk manage-
ment option for industrial chemicals that was newly
introduced with REACH. It aims to assure that the
risks from substances with certain particularly haz-
ardous properties are properly controlled and that
these substances are progressively replaced by suit-
able alternatives. REACH allows for subjecting the
placing on the market and use of SVHCs to a require-
ment for authorisation, effectively reversing the
burden of proof normally associated with restrict-
ing chemicals. Once subject to authorisation, a sub-
stance may only be placed on the market or used
when it is demonstrated that the risks arising from
the use are adequately controlled for (Art. 60 (2)
REACH) or when the use can be justified for socio-
economic reasons and if no economically and tech-
nically viable alternatives are available (Art. 60 (4)).
Before a substance becomes subject to autho-
risation, it passes through a rather complex process
involving multiple steps (Figure 1). First, a member
state prepares a dossier identifying the substance
as falling into one of the following categories based
on its intrinsic properties (Art. 57):
Substances which are carcinogenic, mutagenic
or toxic to reproduction category 1A or 1B (CMR
substances),
Substances which are persistent, bioaccumula-
tive and toxic (PBT substances) or very persist-
ent and very bioaccumulative (vPvB substances)
or
Substances for which there is an equivalent level
of concern (e.g. endocrine disruptors).
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Identified SVHCs are included in the so-called
candidate list. Although the candidate list itself
does not entail a requirement for authorisation, it
leads to a number of important obligations. Sup-
pliers of articles must inform recipients and, on
request, consumers if the article contains an SVHC
in a concentration above 0.1% weight by weight
(Art. 33). Producers and importers of articles must
further notify the European Chemicals Agency
(ECHA) of articles produced or imported which con-
tain an SVHC in a quantity of more than 1 ton per
year above the concentration limit (Art. 7 (2)). The
candidate list was comprised of 151 substances as
of December 2013.
All substances included in the candidate list
enter a prioritization procedure for inclusion into
Annex XIV of the REACH Regulation. Substances
with PBT or vPvB properties, wide dispersive use
and high volumes receive priority to become sub-
ject to authorisation (Art. 58 (3)). The final decision
to amend Annex XIV is taken by the European Com-
mission in accordance with the comitology process.
As of April 2013, 22 substances were listed in Annex
XIV (Commission Regulation (EU) No 348/2013).
In contrast to other obligations in REACH which
apply mainly to manufacturers of chemicals, the
candidate list and authorisation provisions direct-
ly affect numerous other enterprises in the supply
chain of a given chemical. These may include sup-
pliers/distributors of articles (which are defined as
objects which are given a special shape, surface or
design during production determining their func-
tion to a greater degree than does their chemical
composition, like a vehicle or an electronic device)
and mixtures (which are defined as a solution com-
posed of two or more substances) and, most notably,
downstream users of substances. Downstream
users are defined in REACH as any natural or legal
person established within the EU other than the
manufacturer or the importer, who uses a substance
either on its own or in a mixture in the course of
his industrial or professional activities (cf. REACH
Art. 3). Typical downstream users are formulators
producing mixtures (e.g. detergents, paints etc.)
and companies manufacturing or finishing arti-
cles.
Although the relevant supply chains and their
complexity vary from substance to substance, the
general structure of the supply chain as affected
by the candidate list and authorisation provisions
can be illustrated with the example of a color pig-
ment (Figure 2). The pigment itself might be man-
ufactured by a chemical producer located in the
EU. It might then be used by a formulator (down-
stream user) to formulate paint. The finished paint
(a mixture) might be supplied to a distributor who
ships the product to professional end users. One
can easily see that the regulation and possible ban
of the substance in question (in this case, the color
pigment) may not only affect the manufacturer or
importer of the chemical itself but other actors in
the supply chain, including downstream users, dis-
tributors and consumers/end users, who place value
on the economic and technical characteristics of
the substance in the production process or the end
product. 
The candidate list has been the subject of much
debate. For manufacturers of chemicals, there is a
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Figure 2 Example of a supply chain for a color pigment.
risk that the inclusion of one of their substances
in the candidate list will lead to a loss of reputa-
tion from being associated with a serious hazard
like cancer. Also, there is a risk of lower demand for
the substance as a result of potential blacklisting
by customers in the supply chain. For downstream
users, SVHCs may play an important role in produc-
tion processes in order to achieve certain function-
alities. Those downstream users which cannot sub-
stitute a candidate substance with a less hazardous
alternative face a risk that their activities will be
disrupted if manufacturers discontinue production
of the substance concerned1 or if actors further
down the supply chain, such as distributors or con-
sumers, insist that no SVHCs be used during pro-
duction or be present in the end product. In severe
cases, this could amount to an existential threat
to a downstream user’s business.
It should be stressed that candidate substances
can be legally produced and used. However, as these
substances could eventually become subject to
authorisation following the prioritization proce-
dure, a successful application for authorisation may
be required to use the substance in the long term.
The underlying uncertainty whether candidate sub-
stances will become subject to authorisation and,
if so, whether and for how long an authorisation
will be granted may adversely impact companies’
willingness and ability to invest in and commit to
the continued supply of candidate substances or
products requiring candidate substances (cf. WVM,
2012).
Because the authorisation requirement is
attached to the use of chemicals and generally not
to the sale or the use of the end product, one com-
mon criticism is that downstream users located in
the EU are placed at a competitive disadvantage
by the authorisation requirement. This is particu-
larly relevant where SVHCs are used during the pro-
duction process of articles. In principle, these process-
es could take place outside the EU and the finished
article could be imported whereby the authorisa-
tion requirement is circumvented (cf. BDI, 2013). For
downstream users in the EU, this translates to a
risk that customers, i.e. the recipients of the arti-
cles, might choose to switch to suppliers outside
the EU as soon as a critical substance becomes sub-
ject to authorisation or, as a precursor to this, is
included in the candidate list. It should be noted
though that such an export of risk by way of mov-
ing production activities to countries with lower
safety standards can also lead to reputational prob-
lems for suppliers of articles.
3 Hypotheses development towards a rep-
utational model
A behavioral analysis of reputation rests on the
assumption that any significant negative or posi-
tive reputational effect on a company can be
observed by changes in purchase behavior even-
tually accompanied by adaptations of provider (sup-
ply) behavior. The latter could be changes in prod-
uct portfolio including innovations, streamlining
of the product range or adapting corporate com-
munications (cf. Grunwald and Hennig, 2012). To
the extent that changes to production and sales
plans of supply chain actors are unforeseen and
associated with adaptation costs or lost gains, a
reputational loss is detectable. Behavioral reactions
towards the candidate list information to reflect,
prevent or reduce any reputational loss to the firm
of the supply chain actor assume the role of the
dependent variable to be explained in this paper. 
The candidate list contains both signals of risk
as indicated by the SVHC categorization and scarci-
ty. The latter refers to the candidate substance itself,
its alternatives or related products (i.e. mixtures or
articles) as the substance could become subject to
authorisation. Both signals and their interrelations
need to be analyzed more closely since they are
subject to the processes of perception and evalu-
ation by supply chain actors potentially evoking
behavioral actions. Both users and providers of the
substance or substance-related products tend to
be highly involved when decoding the candidate
list information as a signal of scarcity. Scarcity could
take the form of users losing their product use or
providers losing their market for the candidate sub-
stance and related products especially when being
unable to absorb resulting losses, e.g. by offering
alternatives. From the negative risk-related con-
tent contained in the candidate list information
potentially threatening an organization’s high pri-
ority goals (cf. Ulmer, et al. 2006), an increasing sit-
uational involvement of supply chain actors can
generally be inferred. According to the Elaboration
Likelihood Model developed by Petty and Caciop-
po (1986), highly involved recipients are motivat-
ed to process factual information e.g. on risks relat-
ed to a product or provider. As a result, perception
of risk is expected to be higher under conditions of
high than low involvement. Therefore, from the
negative risk-related information contained in the
candidate list, perception of risk by supply chain
actors can generally be expected to increase. This
is also grounded on the negativity effect (cf. Miz-
erski, 1982; Niemeyer, 1993; Taylor, 1991) referring to
crisis signal theory, which posits that the effects of
a single crisis event like the candidate listing depend
on its underlying signal potential. The signal poten-
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tial of a crisis event is larger the more it heralds
severe future problems such as long-term con-
sumer health risks or the risk of losing business,
although the current problems may be of limited
nature (cf. Jungermann and Slovic, 1993; Balderjahn
and Mennicken, 1994; Alvensleben and Kafka, 1999;
Grunwald and Hempelmann 2010). An alternative
explanation for this effect can be derived from the
availability heuristic (cf. Tversky and Kahneman,
1973) describing the tendency to make judgments,
e.g. on risk, based on how easy it is to recall simi-
lar instances or how topical the risk-related infor-
mation is. By including a substance on the candi-
date list, risk-related information is made topical
which according to recency effect leads recipients
to better remember the information and to receive
greater weight in forming judgments as compared
to information presented earlier. From this the fol-
lowing hypothesis derives.
H1: Listing a substance on the candidate list
increases supply chain actors’ perception of sub-
stance-related risk. 
It should be noted at this instance that the mere
fact that a substance is identified as SVHC and will
be subject to further regulation can also reduce
supply chain actors’ perception of risk since further
obligations concerned with intensifying risk com-
munication apply. So, if actors actually perceive
their rights according to Art. 33 REACH, they may
intensively be willing to ask providers for clarifica-
tion and, if answered promptly and competently,
can reduce perceived risks. Lower levels of perceived
risk in turn can lead to better evaluations of prod-
uct and provider quality which generally benefits
provider reputation. However, as practical experi-
ence shows, information requests can be numer-
ous and very complex due to the high complexity
of supply chains so that any fast reductions in per-
ceived risk are less probable which is therefore cor-
roborating hypothesis H1. 
When perceiving risks, the question arises who
is responsible for the existence of substance-relat-
ed risks and consequently for controlling or reduc-
ing them. According to attribution theory, individ-
uals are rational processors of information whose
acts are influenced by conclusions or causal events.
They attempt to find reasons for the success (e.g.
a satisfactory product performance) or failure (e.g.
a perceived problem and risk with the product) of
use-related processes and normally categorize them
according to a three-dimensional scheme (cf. Folkes
et al., 1987; O`Malley Jr., 1996):
The first dimension refers to location, i.e. the
individual locates the cause(s) of success or fail-
ure. It asks whether the reason for a problem is
more likely to be attributed to external factors such
as the supplier, situation and external events or
internal factors (of the user himself). The second
dimension of stability focuses on the (temporal)
endurance of the cause(s) of success or failure. On
the one hand, if causes are stable or permanent in
nature, there is a greater likelihood that similar
problems will arise in future due to the fact that
its cause is unchangeable. Similar problems are less
likely to occur if the cause is unstable in nature. The
third dimension refers to control, i.e. whether it is
possible for users and/or suppliers to influence the
possible causes of success or failure. Controllable
causes are those over which the supplier or cus-
tomer exercise a degree of influence: accordingly,
it may have been possible to prevent the problem
by taking certain steps like applying risk manage-
ment measures. On the other hand, non-control-
lable causes are beyond the influence of the sup-
plier or customer. 
As the candidate list provides negative use relat-
ed information, it seems plausible for users to more
strongly engage in attributional activity. From an
increasing attributional thinking and due to a lack
of positive information e.g. from providers explain-
ing the reasons for still using the hazardous sub-
stance, users in general may hold the provider
responsible for the existence of substance-related
risks. Still using the substance and not substitut-
ing it or taking measures to further reduce risks
may generally be perceived as a cause of risk con-
trollable by the provider. This is expressed in the
following hypothesis.
H2: Listing a substance on the candidate list
increases users’ perception of provider responsi-
bility (of substance manufacturers, downstream
users or distributors) for the existence of substance-
related risks.
Fueled by higher levels of involvement, both
perceived degree of exposure to the candidate sub-
stance and perceived availability of alternatives,
are assumed to directly impact perceived substance-
related risks and provider responsibility, respective-
ly. The impact of perceived exposure on perceived
substance-related risk seems self-explanatory in
that the level of exposure beyond other variables
forms a key factor in risk assessment determining
the level of risk. The influence is described by the
following hypothesis: 
H3: The higher users’ perception of substance
exposure, the higher is their perception of sub-
stance-related risks.  
The impact of perceived availability of alterna-
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tives on perceived provider responsibility is less
obvious and needs further explanation. According
to attribution theory, the less (more) a provider is
able to control or reduce substance-related risks,
the less (more) he is held a plausible cause for the
existence of the risks. For instance, a large compa-
ny provider with a considerable R&D budget who
could have invested much more in the past into
early substitution and measures to control or reduce
risks is attributed more responsibility than a small-
er company provider being unable to take such
measures. For the smaller provider, the cause for
lacking alternatives seems to be less controllable
than for the large company provider. In case alter-
natives are widely available on the market to both
small and large company providers, recipients of
this information are prone to attribute more blame
on providers in general irrespective of company
size as under conditions of low availability. Any
defensive approach like further waiting to substi-
tute SVHCs through alternatives is likely to be fur-
ther challenged by users. From this hypothesis 4
derives.  
H4: The higher supply chain actors’ perception
of availability of alternatives, the more providers
are perceived responsible for the existence of sub-
stance-related risks.
Given that high involvement motivates recipi-
ents of the candidate list to more intensely evalu-
ate its information content, the process of evalua-
tion of perceived signals of risk and scarcity in form-
ing users’ attitudes towards providers of substances
and related products needs to be further scruti-
nized. Users’ attitude is assumed to be an endur-
ing variable to reflect users’ evaluations of the
provider’s quality and conduct (cf. Grunwald and
Hennig, 2012) being influenced by situational vari-
ables like perception of substance-related risks and
provider responsibility capable of evoking behav-
ioral reactions. Consistently, according to research
on negative publicity, perceptions of risk as well as
perceived provider responsibility reflecting users’
attributions of blame for any existence of product-
related problems or risks are directly linked to the
reputation construct (cf. Grunwald and Hempel-
mann, 2010; Standop, 2006; Tucker and Melewar,
2005; Matos and Veiga, 2004; Dean, 2004; Lyon and
Cameron, 2004 and 1998; Gutteling, 2001; Dawar
and Pillutla, 2000; Tadelis, 1999; Coombs, 1998;
Dawar, 1998; Al-Najjar, 1995; Siomkos and Kurzbard,
1994; Siomkos and Shrivastava, 1993; Mowen, 1980). 
Drawing on this stream of research, it is assumed
for increases in risk perception and provider respon-
sibility for the existence of such risks to negative-
ly impact users’ attitudes towards providers of SVHC
related products in absence of any provider reac-
tion regarding crisis management to reduce such
negative perceptions. This rests on the assumption
for the candidate list information to be perceived
as credible and correct by users. However, it is not
far from being realistic for recipients to also ques-
tion the validity of the information received with-
in their evaluative process of attitude formation.
For instance, potential long-term negative effects
of the chemical may be devaluated by users due to
perceived forecast uncertainty of long-term impact
assessments (cf. Grunwald, 2010). Besides, high indi-
vidual time preference rates characteristic for
myopic buying behavior may lead users to discount
the negative risk-related information in light of
(positive) scarcity information benefitting an alto-
gether more positive risk and consequently better
cost-benefit evaluation (cf. Hummel, 1999; Loewen-
stein, 1992). Since the candidate list information
has an official status as being part of a legal pro-
cedure, it is assumed here that the negative influ-
ence of perceived risk and provider responsibility
on attitude formation is likely to prevail as is reflect-
ed in the following two hypotheses.
H5: In absence of any provider response, the
higher users’ perception of risk, the more negative
are their attitudes towards providers of SVHCs or
related products. 
H6: In absence of any provider response, the
higher users’ perception of provider responsibility
for the existence of substance-related risks, the
more negative are their attitudes towards providers
of SVHCs or related products. 
Drawing on attitude-behavior-hypothesis and
with generally increased levels of involvement of
supply chain actors as typically found on business-
to-business markets and further enhanced by the
candidate list, it is assumed here for users’ attitudes
towards the provider to influence supply chain
actors’ demand and supply, respectively, as long as
changes in attitudes are perceivable to them. This
holds true because changes in attitudes of cus-
tomers can be seen as predictors of future demand
to be placed on the respective supplier the attitude
refers to. Thus, the subsequent attitude-behavior-
hypotheses for each individual supply chain actor
emerge. 
H7: The more negatively end-consumers’ atti-
tudes towards the provider of the SVHC contain-
ing article are impacted by the candidate list, the
lower is their demand for the article. 
H8: The more negatively distributors’ atti-
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tudes towards the provider of the SVHC contain-
ing product (article or mixture) are impacted by
the candidate list, the lower is their demand for
the product.
H9: The more negatively downstream users’
attitudes towards the provider of the SVHC or SVHC
containing mixture are impacted by the candidate
list, the lower is their demand for the substance or
related mixture.
H10: The more negatively users’ attitudes
towards the SVHC manufacturer are impacted by
the candidate list, the lower is substance manu-
facturer’s supply of the candidate substance.
The latter may even hold under conditions of
stable demand when the substance manufactur-
er takes precautionary measures to shielding his
own reputation and avoiding negative spill-over-
effects to further products from his range. As already
explained, listing a substance on the candidate list
shows a potential to signal both negative sub-
stance-related risks and (future) scarcity of a spe-
cific substance or the substance-related products,
drawing attention to a potential substance ban
concomitant with considerable lack of information
on alternatives and the way the substance will final-
ly be regulated. Therefore, besides analyzing per-
ception and evaluation of risk drawing on negative
publicity and product-harm crises research (cf. Stan-
dop and Grunwald, 2009 for a literature review),
also analyzing forms and distribution of scarcity
along the supply chain provides useful insights into
behavioral reactions of supply chain actors (cf. Lynn
and Bogert, 1996; Brock, 1968; Ditto and Jemmott,
1989; Brannon and Brock, 2001; Inman et al., 1997).
Since scarcity in turn is likely to depend on supply
chain actors’ power relative to other actors, an actor-
specific analysis of reputational effects incorporat-
ing the construct of supply chain power promises
in-depth insights.
Power in the supply chain represents the extent
to which a company has influence on other mem-
bers of the supply chain, in turn reflecting an actor’s
degree of dependency on other actor(s) which can
take various forms such as coercive or reward (cf.
French and Raven, 1959; Maloni and Benton, 1999).
It is based on access to scarce resources like infor-
mation (non-material) or commodities (material)
or the interrelation between the two. Scarce com-
modities can be thought of as chemical substances
technically or economically indispensable for com-
petitively attaining product characteristics crucial
to customers. Scarcity of information in the con-
text of REACH supply chains can take the form of
limited knowledge or access to information on how
a substance can be used in processing a mixture
or an article. Such information may be asymmet-
rically distributed between actors along the sup-
ply chain (cf. Grunwald and Ostendorf, 2013). Sim-
ilarly, private end-consumers could perceive risk-
related compared to promotional information as
scarce. Both scarcity of information and commod-
ity can limit an actor’s response options and infor-
mation settings relevant for decision making both
varying with their relative supply chain power. 
Reactions towards perceived asymmetry in sup-
ply chain power can be psychological, like cogni-
tive reactance e.g. to be perceived by consumers
when feeling inadequately informed about prod-
uct risks potentially leading to consumer distrust,
as well as behavioral (cf. Grunwald and Hennig,
2012; Jones and Brehm, 1970; Kroeber-Riel and Wein-
berg, 1996). According to balance theories such as
contribution inducement theory (cf. March and
Simon, 1993), equity theory (cf. Homans, 1968; Adams,
1965) or theory of cognitive dissonance (cf. Fes-
tinger, 1957), imbalances in the cognitive system
like in the form of (anticipated) decreases in the
balance of inducement utilities over contribution
utilities (cf. Tosi, 2009), psychological reactance or
deteriorating output-input-ratios will motivate
deciders to reduce them in order to (re-)gain cog-
nitive equilibrium or harmony. With regard to power
imbalances in the supply chain, this can be achieved
by compensating shortfalls in informational power
sources through material ones and vice versa. Sup-
ply chain power is assumed to influence both psy-
chological and behavioral reactions. While the lat-
ter seems to be self-explanatory in that material
or financial disposition limits strategic choice, the
former grounds on information processing to be
largely dependent on the amount and quality of
information available. 
Market success of substance manufacturers is
dependent on derived demand for the substance
produced. It describes the demand placed on the
substance to be dependent on the demand and
changes in the price for mixtures or articles relat-
ed to that substance. Assuming the candidate sub-
stance to be crucial for end product quality, in
absence of suitable alternatives any credible mar-
ket signal of scarcity like the candidate list infor-
mation could entail (temporary) increases in prices
for that substance. This is explained by users (i.e.
formulators, article manufacturers and distribu-
tors) increasing their demand to build up stocks of
the substance or the mixture or articles contain-
ing that substance in expectancy of scarcity given
constant substance supply for the time being. 
A similar effect can be observed with regard to
end-consumers and distributors building up their
stocks of traditional light bulbs to be phased out
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in the EU in favor of a new generation of energy-
efficient lighting. The example may insofar be well
paralleled to the case of SVHCs as alternatives such
as new energy-saving light bulbs may as well pos-
sess negative properties like developing electrical
smog or containing cancer causing chemicals (cf.
Ward, 2011). Side-effects of alternatives may be
explored less than those of the candidate substance
so that the majority of the manufacturers’ direct
or indirect clients will be decoding the candidate
list information more likely as a (positive) signal of
scarcity than a (negative) signal of risk. 
Resulting stable or even rising demand for the
substance will nourish positive profit expectations
at least temporarily causing the substance manu-
facturer to maintain or even increase production
and supply. This general dependency of the sub-
stance manufacturer’s supply from downstream
users’ demand and in turn downstream users’
demand from the demand of distributors (e.g. retail-
ers) as reflecting end-consumer demand for prod-
uct quality relying on the candidate substance is
expressed by the following hypotheses. These
hypotheses also reflect demand effects which are
not necessarily dependent on prior attitude forma-
tion as is likely to be the case with lowly involved
actors.  
H11: The higher (lower) end-consumers’ demand
for product quality relying on the candidate sub-
stance, the higher (lower) is distributors’ demand
for substance-related products. 
H12: The higher (lower) distributors’ demand
for products related to the candidate substance,
the higher (lower) is downstream users’ demand
for the candidate substance. 
H13: The higher (lower) downstream users’
demand for the candidate substance, the higher
(lower) is manufacturers’ supply of the candidate
substance. 
The analysis reveals potential determinants of
the reputational loss of the respective supply chain
actors resulting in the behavioral model displayed
in Figure 3. As can be seen from Figure 3, direct
changes in demand to the market are primarily
end-consumer driven. However, behavioral reac-
tions of actors further up in the supply chain may
as well be indirectly induced by attitudinal changes
as is reflected by hypotheses 8, 9 and 10 which are
therefore shown dashed in Figure 3. 
4 Empirical results on German supply
chain actor adaptions: Methodology and
discussion
While there has been much debate about the
candidate list and the authorisation procedure
under REACH, any evidence on the actual impact
of these instruments on enterprises in the supply
chain of chemicals has so far been largely anecdot-
al. Some empirical evidence can be derived from a
study commissioned by the European Commission
in preparation for the Commission’s review of
REACH in 2012. The study was based on a survey
conducted by CSES (Centre for Strategy & Evalua-
tion Services LLP) between June and August 2011
in which affected companies across the EU were
asked to report their experiences with the opera-
tion of the REACH Regulation via an online ques-
tionnaire. The general results of the survey can be
found in CSES (2012) and NKR (2012). In this section,
the answers of German manufacturers of chemi-
cals, downstream users and distributors to the sur-
vey questions focusing on the impact of the can-
didate list are analyzed. The sample consists of 181
manufacturers, 161 downstream users (formula-
tors and manufacturers of articles) and 9 distribu-
tors. Here, it should be noted that some survey par-
ticipants did not answer some questions so the
number of respondents may not be the same for
all questions. The results are discussed in the same
order below.
18% of manufacturers stated that one or more
of the substances they produce is included in the
candidate list. The survey participants were asked
what the result of the entry of a substance they
produce in the candidate list for authorisation has
been. The most wide-spread impact was an increase
in costs for the business as a result of the informa-
tion requirements triggered by the candidate list
(as shown in Table 1, 61% of respondents said this
occurred “sometimes”, “frequently” or “always”).
55% of respondents stated that the inclusion of a
substance in the candidate list led to a reduction
in the demand for the substance. Hence, an impact
of the candidate status on the demand of a sub-
stance is registered by manufacturers in just over
half of the reported cases but apparently not in the
others. The developed behavioral model may aid
in explaining this ambivalent picture through the
recognition that case-specific factors such as the
availability of alternatives and the perception of
risks may influence behavioral reactions from actors
in the supply chain that determine the total demand
for a substance.
When asked whether they have decided to with-
draw any substance from the market as a result of
REACH, 23% of manufacturers answered in the affir-
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Table 1 Impact of entry of substance in candidate list from manufacturer’s perspective (representative sample of 181
manufacturers of chemicals in Germany, survey conducted by CSES between June and August 2011).
Potential impact of candidate list Likelihood of occurrence according to respondents
Don’t
know Never Seldom Sometimes Frequently Always
No impact 10% 40% 15% 15% 0% 20%
Led to an increase in the costs for
the business as a result of the
requirement to provide informati-
on to customers
19% 14% 5% 14% 14% 33%
Led to a reduction in the demand
for the specific substance 10% 15% 20% 20% 5% 30%
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mative and 25% declined but said that they are con-
sidering doing so in the future. However, only 22%
stated the reason for the withdrawal was the inclu-
sion of the substance in the candidate list (other
possible reasons were that the substance was sub-
ject to a restriction or to a registration requirement
under REACH). This calls into question whether rep-
utational risk associated with the candidate sta-
tus is the primary concern of manufacturers when
deciding whether to continue marketing a sub-
stance. It should also be noted that the withdraw-
al of a certain substance from the market by one
manufacturer does not necessarily lead to the non-
availability of that substance to downstream users
since there is usually more than one manufactur-
er or importer placing a particular substance on
the market.
54% of downstream users stated that one or
more of the substances used in their formula-
tions/mixtures or in the articles they produce is
included in the candidate list. Like for manufactur-
ers, the most wide-spread result of the candidate
listing was an increase in costs due to the informa-
tion requirements which 80% of downstream users
said happened sometimes, frequently or always,
as shown in Table 2. 61% of respondents indicated
that the inclusion in the candidate list led to the
decision to replace the substance with a less haz-
ardous one. This shows that the candidate list may
indeed increase awareness and involvement regard-
ing substance-related risks and prompt substitu-
tion efforts on the part of downstream users, pro-
vided that suitable alternatives exist. Suppliers
removing the substance from the market (which
could disrupt downstream users’ activities if criti-
cal substances are no longer available) and increas-
es in the price of the substance do not appear to
be dominant impacts of the candidate list from the
perspective of downstream users. The latter point
is somewhat surprising since it could be expected
that suppliers would adjust prices for candidate
substances upwards to account for increased costs
due to information requirements and possible rep-
utational risks.
55% of downstream users stated that they have
experienced the withdrawal of one or more criti-
cal substances used in the production of formula-
tions or articles as a result of REACH and a further
22% are expecting this to happen in the future. The
relatively high percentage of respondents experi-
encing or expecting the withdrawal of substances
underlines the potentially challenging position of
downstream users which are typically located at
an intermediate stage of the supply chain. Conse-
quently, they may be directly affected by behav-
ioral reactions of both supply-side and demand-
side actors to changes in attitudes towards SVHCs
or SVHC-related products. When asked what has
been their response to the withdrawal of critical
substances, 77% of responding downstream users
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Table 2 Impact of entry of substance in candidate list from downstream user’s perspective (representative sample of 161
downstream users in Germany, survey conducted by CSES between June and August 2011).
Potential impact of candidate list Likelihood of occurrence according to respondents
Don’t
know Never Seldom Sometimes Frequently Always
No impact 3% 24% 17% 21% 21% 14%
Led to an increase in the costs for the
business as a result of the requirement
to provide information to customers
3% 7% 10% 27% 30% 23%
Led to an increase in the price of the
substance(s) 21% 29% 21% 18% 0% 11%
Led to the decision of your suppliers to
remove the substance from the market 6% 29% 26% 29% 6% 6%
Led to the decision to replace the sub-
stance with a less hazardous substance 3% 25% 11% 25% 25% 11%
answered that they sometimes, frequently or always
switched to other substances with less hazardous
properties. In contrast, only 39% switched to anoth-
er supplier in the EU and 25% to another supplier
outside the EU. This leads to the conclusion that if
the supply of an SVHC is disrupted as a result of
the supplier stopping production e.g. due to a fear
of negative publicity, a downstream user would be
more likely to attempt to substitute the substance
with an alternative rather than to try to find anoth-
er supplier for the same problematic substance.
100% of distributors participating in the survey
said that the products they distribute or sell con-
tain one or more chemical substances included in
the candidate list. When asked what has been their
response to the inclusion of a substance in the can-
didate list, 57% of distributors stated that they asked
their suppliers to stop supplying products that
include the substance or to ensure that none of the
products supplied contain the substance. The
remaining 43% had no specific response. Although
the survey’s sample size for distributors is too small
to draw any final conclusions, it is apparent that a
very high percentage of distributors have experi-
enced that substances they sell as such or that are
contained in products they sell were placed on the
candidate list. The reaction of more than half of
the responding distributors was to in effect black-
list those substances. As end products are usually
sold to the end user or consumer through distrib-
utors, such companies often have the legal respon-
sibility for communicating to the final customer
that an article contains an SVHC. The result that a
significant share of distributors (but not all) black-
listed candidate substances is consistent with the
developed behavioral model in so far as there is on
one hand a strong tendency for distributors to avoid
the reputational risk of being associated with prod-
ucts containing SVHCs. On the other hand, an out-
right blacklisting of candidate substances may not
be feasible or desirable from the distributor’s point
of view in all circumstances, for instance, when the
end customer’s involvement and degree of expo-
sure are low and there are no suitable alternatives.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this research paper is to develop a
behavioral reputational model to describe and
explain potential effects of the REACH candidate
list of substances subject to authorisation on sup-
ply chain actors’ reputation. The candidate list is
an instrument provided by the EU chemicals reg-
ulation to publicly announce and prioritize SVHCs
as a first step of imposing an obligation of autho-
risation on them. As the candidate list comprises
signals of risk and scarcity of information and com-
modity (i.e. a potential lack of the substance, sub-
stance-related products or alternatives), the repu-
tational model is based on negative publicity and
risk perception research considering the distribu-
tion of information and power across actors along
the supply chain. 
The crucial factors in determining a potential
reputational loss induced by listing a substance on
the candidate list appear to be the supply chain
actors’ involvement raising perceptions of sub-
stance-related risks and provider responsibility for
the existence of such risks being influenced by per-
ceived exposure to the candidate substance and
availability of alternatives. Perceptions of risk and
provider responsibility in turn are supposed to
directly impact actors’ attitudes towards the SVHC
(or related product) provider. Attitudes towards the
SVHC provider form a mediating variable hypoth-
esized to elicit behavioral reactions (such as reduc-
ing demand, blacklisting the substance or with-
drawing it from the market) with unforeseen
changes in buying or supplying behavior indicat-
ing a reputational loss to the respective supply
chain actor. Whereas direct changes in demand to
the market according to the model appear to be
primarily end-consumer driven, behavioral reac-
tions of actors further up in the supply chain may
as well be indirectly induced by attitudinal changes. 
Preliminary experience of companies with the
candidate list derived from a study commissioned
by the European Commission is used in this paper
to shed light on the empirical relevance of the rep-
utational model developed. The results show that
a significant percentage of the surveyed actors have
already been directly affected by the inclusion of
substances in the candidate list and this will inten-
sify as further SVHCs are identified. The candidate
status often leads to non-negligible costs for ful-
filling information requirements and potentially
to a decrease in demand but the severity of this
perceived effect cannot be quantified with the avail-
able data. In addition to the perception of reputa-
tional risks by manufacturers and a heightened
level of awareness in the supply chain, demonstrat-
ed impacts of the candidate list include substitu-
tion efforts by downstream users and blacklisting
by retailers. However, in practice the occurrence of
these potential impacts varies widely from case to
case and differences in substances’ properties, uses
and supply chains likely play a key role in this, as
suggested by the developed behavioral model.
Further empirical evidence is needed to empir-
ically test the reputational model derived. These
data could be gathered by stakeholder consulta-
tions using questionnaire designs incorporating
the constructs used in the model to enable micro-
analyses. Companies may use the model to derive
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suitable strategies of corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR), e.g. communicative responses, to man-
age negative publicity induced by the candidate
list and to shield or rebuild reputation by consid-
ering e.g. perceptions of substance exposure and
availability of alternatives as strategic target vari-
ables in shaping attitudes. 
References
Adams, J. S. (1965): Inequity in Social Exchange, in:
L. Berkowitz (ed.) Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology,  2, New York: Academic Press,
pp. 267-299.
Al-Najjar, N. I. (1995): Reputation, product quality,
and warranties, Journal of Economics & Man-
agement Strategy, 3, pp. 605-637.
Alvensleben, v. R. and Kafka, C . (1999): Grundprob-
leme der Risikokommunikation und ihre Bedeu-
tung für die Land- und Ernährungswirtschaft,
Working Paper, University of Kiel (Germany).
Balderjahn, I. and Mennicken, C. (1994): Der Umgang
von Managern mit ökologischen Risiken und
Krisen: Ein verhaltenswissenschaftlicher Ansatz,
Lehr- und Forschungsbericht Nr. 2, Wirtschafts-
und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Lehrstuhl
für Betriebswirtschaftslehre mit dem Schwer-
punkt Marketing, University of Potsdam (Ger-
many).
Brannon L. A. and Brock, T. C. (2001): Scarcity Claims
Elicit Extreme Responding to Persuasive Mes-
sages: Role of Cognitive Elaboration, Personal-
ity and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27 (3), pp. 365-
375.
Brock, T. C. (ed.) (1968): Implications of Commodity
Theory for Value Change, New York: Academic
Press.
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) (2013):
Position paper on the application of the risk-
based approach to the selection of instruments
for substance regulation under the REACH reg-
ulation (document number D 0583).
Büschken, J. (1999): Wirkung von Reputation zur
Reduktion von Qualitätsunsicherheit,Working
Paper Nr. 123 der Katholischen Universität Eich-
stätt, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Ingolstadt, Oktober 1999, Ingolstadt.
Büschken, J. (2000): Reputation Networks and “Loose
Linkages” between Reputation and Quality,
Working Paper Nr. 141, Katholische Universität
Eichstätt, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Ingolstadt, September 2000, Ingolstadt.
European Commission (2003): Staff Working Paper,
Extended Impact Assessment for REACH,
COM(2003)644 final, Brussels.
Commission Regulation (EU) No 348/2013 of 17 April
2013 amending Annex XIV to Regulation (EC)
No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Registration, Evaluation,
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals
(REACH), Official Journal of the European Union,
L 108/1.
Coombs, W. T. (1998): An analytic framework for cri-
sis situations: Better responses from a better
understanding of the situation, Journal of Pub-
lic Relations Research, 10 (3), pp. 177-191.
Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES)
(2012): Interim evaluation: Impact of the REACH
regulation on the innovativeness of the EU
chemical industry, Final Report.
Dawar, N. (1998): Product-harm crises and the sig-
naling ability of brands, International Studies
of Management & Organization, 28 (3), pp. 109-
119.
Dawar, N. and Pillutla, M. M. (2000): Impact of prod-
uct-harm crises on brand equity: The moderat-
ing role of consumer expectations, Journal of
Marketing Research, 37, pp. 215-226.
Dean, D. H. (2004): Consumer Reaction to Negative
Publicity: Effects of Corporate Reputation,
Response, and Responsibility for a Crisis Event,
Journal of Business Communication, 41 (2), pp.
192-211.
Ditto, P. H. and Jemmott III, J. B. (1989): From Rarity
to Evaluative Extremity: Effects of Prevalence
Information on Evaluations of Positive and Neg-
ative Characteristics, Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 57 (1), pp. 16-26.
Folkes, V. S., Koletsky S. and Graham, J. (1987): A Field
Study of Causal Inferences and Consumer Reac-
tion: The View from the Airport, Journal of Con-
sumer Research, 13, pp. 534-539.
French, J. R.P. and Raven, B. (1959): Bases of Social
Power, in: D. Cartwright (ed.) Studies in Social
Power, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, pp.
150-167.
Getzner, M. (2013): Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse der
Umsetzung von REACH in Österreich, Beitrag
zur Tagung Chemiepolitik, 5. November 2013,
Dortmund.
Grunwald, G. (2010): Die sozioökonomische Analyse
in Chemieunternehmen: Herausforderungen
bei der Umsetzung der Europäischen
Chemikalienverordnung, Ökologisches
Wirtschaften, Journal for Ecological Economy
4, pp. 30-34.
Grunwald, G. and Hempelmann, B. (2010): Impacts
of Reputation for Quality on Perceptions of Com-
pany Responsibility and Product-related Dan-
gers in times of Product-recall and Public Com-
plaints Crises: Results from an Empirical Inves-
tigation, Corporate Reputation Review, 13 (4),
Guido Grunwald and Philipp Hennig
Journal of Business Chemistry 2014, 11 (2)© 2014 Institute of Business Administration 64
pp. 264-283.
Grunwald, G. and Hennig, P. (2012): REACH und CSR
– Mehr Reputation durch Nachhaltigkeit in
kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen, Lohmar –
Cologne: Eul.
Grunwald, G. and Ostendorf, R.-J. (2013): Kompati-
bilität moderner Kommunikationsanforderun-
gen an KMU mit der Dynamischen Ökolo-
gieführerschaft, in: J.-A. Meyer (ed.) Kommu-
nikation kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen –
Jahrbuch der KMU-Forschung und -Praxis
Lohmar – Cologne: Eul, pp. 123-150.
Gutteling, J. M. (2001): Current views on risk com-
munication and their implications for crisis and
reputation management, Document Design, 2
(3), pp. 236-246.
Heitmann, K. and Reihlen, A. (2007): Case study on
“Announcement effect” in the market related
to the candidate list of substances subject to
authorisation’, Hamburg: Ökopol GmbH Insti-
tute for Environmental Strategies.
Homans, G. (1968): Elementarformen sozialen Ver-
haltens, Cologne: Springer.
Hummel, M. E. (1999): Zeitpräferenz in der Ökonomie
– eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme, Working
Paper IANUS Technische Universität Darmstadt
1/1999, Darmstadt. 
Inman, J. J., Peter, A. C. and Raghubir, P. (1997): Fram-
ing the Deal: The Role of Restrictions in Accen-
tuating Deal Value, Journal of Consumer
Research, 24, pp. 68-79.
Jones, R. A., Brehm, J. W. (1970): Persuasiveness of
one-sided and twosided communication as a
function of awareness that there are two sides,
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 6, pp. 47-
56.
Jungermann, H. and Slovic, P. (1993): Charakteristi-
ka individueller Risikowahrnehmung, in
Bayrische Rück (ed.) Risiko ist ein Konstrukt,
Reihe, Gesellschaft und Unsicherheit, Vol. 2,
Munich: Knesebeck, pp. 89-108 .
Kroeber-Riel, W. and Weinberg, P. (1996): Kon-
sumentenverhalten, 6th ed., Munich: Vahlen.
Loewenstein, G. (1992): The Fall and Rise of Psycho-
logical Explanations in the Economics of
Intertemporal Choice, in: G. Loewenstein and J.
Elster (eds.): Choice of Time, New York: Russell
Sage, pp. 3-34.
Lynn, M. and Bogert, P. (1996): The Effect of Scarci-
ty on Anticipated Price Appreciation, Journal of
Applied Social Psychology, 26 (22), pp. 1978-1984.
Lyon , L. and Cameron, G. T. (1998): Fess up or
stonewall? An experimental test of prior repu-
tation and response style in the face of nega-
tive news coverage, Web Journal of Mass Com-
munication Research, 1, available at
http://www.scripps.ohiou.edu/wjmcr/vol01/1-
4a-B.htm.
Lyon, L. and Cameron, G . T. (2004): A relational
approach examining the interplay of prior rep-
utation and immediate response to a crisis, Jour-
nal of Public Relations Research, 16 (3), pp.  213-
224 .
Maloni, M., Benton, W.C. (1999): Power influences
in the supply chain, Working paper, Fisher Col-
lege of Business, The Ohio State University, pp.
1-49.
March J. and Simon, H. (1993): Organizations, 2nd
ed., Oxford: Blackwell.
Matos, C. A. de and Veiga, R. T. (2004): The effects
of Negative Publicity and Company Reaction on
Consumer Attitudes, Working Paper, Center for
Management Research and Postgraduate Cours-
es, Belo Horizonte, Brazil.
Mizerski, R. W. (1982): An Attribution Explanation
of the Disproportionate Influence of Unfavor-
able Information, Journal of Consumer Research,
9, pp. 301-367.
Mowen, J. C. (1980): Further information on con-
sumer perceptions of product recalls, Advances
in Consumer Research, 7, pp. 519-523.
Nationaler Normenkontrollrat (NKR) (2012):
Schwachstellenanalyse der Registrierungspflicht-
en durch die europäische Chemikalienverord-
nung REACH.
Niemeyer, H.-G. (1993): Begründungsmuster von
Konsumenten, Attributionstheoretische Grund-
lagen und Einflussmöglichkeiten im Marketing,
Heidelberg: Physica.
O`Malley Jr., J. R. (1996): Consumer Attributions of
Product Failures to Channel Members, Advances
in Consumer Research, 23, pp. 342-345.
Petty, R. E. and Cacioppo, J. T. (1986): Communica-
tion and persuasion: Central and peripheral
routes to attitude change, New York: Springer.
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 18 December 2006
concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Autho-
risation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),
Official Journal of the European Union L 396/1.
Schwalbach, J. (2000): Image, Reputation und
Unternehmenswert, Working Paper,Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, 10th of June 2000, Berlin.
Siomkos, G. and Kurzbard, G . (1994): The hidden cri-
sis in product-harm crisis management, Euro-
pean Journal of Marketing, 28 (2), pp. 30-41.
Siomkos, G. and Shrivastava, P. (1993): Responding
to product liability crises, Long Range Planning,
26 (5), pp. 72-79.
Standop, D. (2006): Der Verlust von Konsumenten-
vertrauen gegenüber Anbietern: Der Fall von
Produktrückrufen, in: H. Bauer, M. Neumann and
A. Schüle, (eds.) Konsumentenvertrauen:
Konzepte und Anwendungen für ein nach-
Impacts of the REACH candidate list of substances subject to authorisation:
The reputation mechanism and empirical results on behavioral adaptations of
German supply chain actors
Journal of Business Chemistry 2014, 11 (2) © 2014 Institute of Business Administration 65
haltiges Kundenbindungsmanagement, Munich:
Vahlen, pp. 95-104.
Standop, D. and Grunwald, G. (2009): How to solve
product-harm crises in retailing? Empirical
insights from service recovery and negative pub-
licity research, International Journal of Retail &
Distribution Management, 37 (11), pp. 915-932.
Tadelis, S. (1999): What’s in a name? Reputation as
a tradeable asset, The American Economic
Review, 89 (3), pp. 548-563.
Taylor, S. E. (1991): Asymmetrical Effects of Positive
and Negative Events: The Mobilization Mini-
mization Hypothesis, Psychological Bulletin, 110
(1), pp. 67-85.
Tchibo (2011): Auswirkungen der Kandidatenliste -
Aufwand und Nutzen: Wie geht der Handel mit





tionFile&v=2, accessed 09 February 2014.
Tosi, H. L. (2009): Theories of Organization, Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Tucker, L. and Melewar, T. C. (2005): Corporate rep-
utation and crisis management: The threat and
manageability of anti-corporatism, Corporate
Reputation Review, 7 (4), pp. 377-387.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1973): Availability: A
heuristic for judging frequency and probabili-
ty, Cognitive Psychology, 5 (1), pp. 207-233.
Ulmer, R. R., Sellnow, T. L. and Seeger, M. W. (2006):
Effective Crisis Communication: Moving from
Crisis to Opportunity, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Ward, V. (2011): Energy saving light bulbs 'contain
cancer causing chemicals', available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/8462626/En
ergy-saving-light-bulbs-contain-cancercausing-
chemicals.html, accessed 09 February 2014.
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Metalle (WVM) (2012): Per-
spektiven der europäischen Stoffpolitik,
Geschäftsbericht 2011/2012, pp. 64-67.
Guido Grunwald and Philipp Hennig
Journal of Business Chemistry 2014, 11 (2)© 2014 Institute of Business Administration 66
